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‘Man everywhere is still living in prehistory, and
all and everything stands before the creation of
the world, as a right one. True genesis is not at the
beginning, but at the end, and is starts to begin
only when society and existence become radical,
that is, grasp themselves by their roots. But the
root of history is the working, creating human
being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts.
Once he has grasped himself and what is his,
without expropriation and alienation, in real
democracy, there arises in the world something
that shines into the childhood of all, and in which
no one has yet been: Heimat’ (Bloch, 1996:
1375-1376).1
1 In 1961, Ernst Bloch was visiting West Germany with his wife Karola, when he heard the
news that a wall had been erected in Berlin. That the Blochs had been granted a visa by
the East German government confirms the privileged position they still enjoyed, though
who knew for how much longer. Bloch had emigrated to the GDR in 1949, taking up a
Professorship in Philosophy at the University of Leipzig. Initially full of enthusiasm for
the new socialist state, he soon ran into trouble. His heterodox views, which highlighted
the  glaring  gap  between the  regime’s  utopian rhetoric  and the  reality  of  life  under
dictatorship,  quickly  made  him  many  enemies.  His  students  were  threatened,  his
publications blocked, and eventually in 1956 he was forced into retirement. Now, faced
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with  the  prospect  of  German  division,  Ernst  and  Karola  decided  to  remain  in  West
Germany, and Bloch’s decision to flee was seen on both sides of the Iron Curtain as an
acceptance that the utopian socialist project had failed.
2 Three years later,  Bloch took part  in a radio interview with Theodor Adorno on the
contradictions  of  utopian  longing.  The  discussion  ranged  over  philosophy,  art,  and
religion, but politics hovered in the background. When moderator Horst Krüger finally
asked Bloch directly whether the utopian element had ‘entirely disappeared from the
socialism that rules the eastern world today’, Bloch affirmed it had, with the caveat that
‘it has also disappeared in the West and that similar tendencies exist that reproduce the
unity of the epoch despite such great contrasts’ (Bloch, 1988: 13). Adorno agreed that
west and east were united in the conviction that ‘nothing utopian should be allowed to
exist’ (ibid.). The reason why is unsurprising: Adorno and Bloch both agreed that utopia’s
essential function is ‘as a critique of what is present’ (Bloch, 1988: 12). Bloch’s utopianism
had been perceived as a threat to the GDR regime, yet despite the relative freedoms of
capitalist democracy, he argued that it too was unable to tolerate utopia, in which the
‘transformation of the totality,’ as Adorno put it, is at stake (Bloch, 1988: 3).
3 This seems truer than ever today in a context in which the future can only be thought as
either catastrophe or continuation (and therefore also catastrophe). The question with
which Bloch and Adorno were concerned is thus still fundamentally a contemporary one:
what is the value of utopian thought and practice today? Can we really imagine a better
world? Can and should such images be a compass for political action? Adorno argued that
‘[o]ne  may  not  cast  a  picture  of  utopia  in  a  positive  manner’:  only  negatively,  by
criticising the status quo, can an image of utopia be adumbrated (Bloch, 1988: 10). On the
contrary, Bloch insisted on the need to ‘cast a picture’ of utopia, which he saw as partly
coming into being through its portrayal.  ‘As instalment of having been achieved it is
already included when I portray it in a book,’ he said (Bloch, 1988: 11). Such an idea must
have been heretical  to Adorno,  whose commitment to the ban on images of  utopia [
Bilderverbot] was in part motivated by the desire to avoid precisely the kind of abstract
violence so often committed in its pursuit.2
4 Yet, as I will argue in this paper, Bloch’s concept of Heimat demonstrates that he was just
as much an iconoclastic utopian as Adorno (cf. Jacoby, 2005: 32-36). Bloch’s concept of
Heimat far  from simply casts  a  picture in order to ‘avoid the antinomy of  death,’  as
Adorno saw the problem with the utopian image (Bloch, 1988: 10). Rather, it has much
more in common with Walter Benjamin’s dialectical image, in which the present can be
perceived as the moment in which the demands of dead generations might be answered.
These  demands  crystallise  in  Bloch’s  Heimat  figure  around  the  onset  of  capitalist
modernity, when the European consciousness of time and space was reconfigured in a
new understanding of history. I argue that, from a materialist perspective, we are still
contemporaries  of  that  moment,  and thus the value of  Bloch’s  utopia for materialist
politics today lies in its ability to make the present visible as the site of a perpetual call
for radical historical transformation.
 
I. Utopia
5 Something strange happened to the concept of utopia in the second half of the eighteenth
century, which Bloch described as the ‘transformation of the topos from space into time’
(Bloch, 1988: 3). The early utopias of More, Bacon, Campanella, Schnabel and others that
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appeared in Europe from the early sixteenth century onwards had been primarily spatial
fantasies,  traveller’s  tales of  sea voyages to remote,  exotic islands inhabited by ideal
communities that typically eschewed wealth and lived in harmony with nature. Thomas
More’s  inaugural  text  tells  the story of  Raphael  Hythloday,  who travels  to an island
Utopia, where although ‘no one owns anything, everyone is rich. For what can be greater
riches than to live joyfully?’ (More, 2003: 103). Meanwhile, J.G. Schnabel’s Insel Felsenburg
(1731-1743) is a utopian twist on the Robinsonade where the deserted traveller struggles
to survive amidst an inhospitable nature (cf. Schnabel, 2006). Schnabel’s story turns the
tables, with the bankrupt protagonist Eberhard Julius shipwrecked on an island where the
natural  environment  provides  for  the  material  needs  of  all.  The  depiction  of  these
spatially distant worlds threw a critical light on contemporary Europe: the idea that a
perfect society might exist somewhere else compensated for the ills perceived at home.
6 Louis-Sebastian Mercier’s L’An 2440, rêve s’il en fut jamais of 1770 represented a sea change
in the utopian imagination (Mercier, 1999). For the first time, the shortcomings of the
here and now found their fulfilment not in another space, but in another time. After
engaging in a heated debate with a philosopher friend about the injustices of  life in
contemporary Paris, the anonymous protagonist of Mercier’s novel falls asleep and wakes
to find himself transported to a Paris of the future. In Mercier’s future, Paris looks just
the same as it  did in his own present,  with the same streets and landmarks,  but the
injustices Mercier perceived in his own time have been eradicated. The constitutional
monarchy still  rules,  but  the estates  have been replaced by a  meritocratic  elite;  the
Bastille is destroyed, the monarch has left Versailles and lives as a mere mortal; the death
penalty is barely ever required, and when it is, only by those who voluntarily accept it out
of guilt; marriages must be based on love and not on dowries, which perpetuate unequal
social stratification. Mercier’s future thus appears as the rational projection of a series of
transformations already germinating in the Paris of the late eighteenth century, so much
so that his contemporary C.M. Wieland described the book as ‘the Last Judgment of the
present constitution of France’ (cited in Koselleck, 2002: 92). When revolution did in fact
come in 1789, Mercier retrospectively declared himself its prophet.
7 The reasons for what conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck (2002: 84) has called this
‘temporalization  of  utopia’  can  be  found  in  two  developments  associated  with  the
emergence of capitalist modernity: colonialism and secularisation. If in the 1730s it was
still  possible  for  Schnabel  to  imagine  an  undiscovered  island  harbouring  a  perfect
community in the southern oceans, by 1770 this prospect seemed much less realistic: the
same year Mercier’s futuristic utopia was published, Cook had just explored the east coast
of Australia. The idea of a perfect community had nowhere to go but to migrate out of
space and into time. Yet the utopian future Mercier imagines is not divine, eternal realm,
but a historical future, which assumes a spatial continuity with his contemporary, earthly
Paris.  The  imagination  of  a  historical  future  that  would  qualitatively  transcend  the
present only became possible, as Peter Osborne has argued elsewhere, ‘once Christian
eschatology had shed its constant expectation of the imminent arrival of doomsday, and
the advance of the sciences and the growing consciousness of the “New World” and its
peoples had opened up new horizons of expectation’ (Osborne, 1995: 11). 
8 A utopia of the future, which relies for its credibility on a connection to the empirically
redeemable present, must be underpinned by a linear philosophy of history. It is perhaps
no  wonder,  then,  that  the  temporalization  of  utopia  should  take  place  in  the  same
historical moment in which progressive philosophy of history emerged. Koselleck names
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this  moment  the  Sattelzeit,  a  period  from  around  1750-1850,  which  saw  a  radical
transformation in historical consciousness. During the Sattelzeit, Koselleck argues, time
becomes  ‘no  longer  simply  the  medium in  which  all  histories  take  place;  it  gains  a
historical  quality.  Consequently,  history no longer occurs in,  but through time.  Time
becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right’ (2004: 246). The Enlightenment
and the French Revolution fundamentally unsettled the traditional idea that predictions
for the future could be made from the past:  the future appeared radically open and
undetermined by anything other than human will. 
9 The concepts of radical incompletion and human authorship of history were combined in
Rousseau’s theory of perfectibility, which heavily influenced Mercier. If Rousseau argued
that  perfectibility,  as  an  ‘almost  unlimited  faculty’  of  the  human  species,  was  the
condition of possibility for historical progress, then it was not in an unalloyed spirit of
historical optimism (Rousseau, 2003: 141). For Rousseau, perfectibility led human beings
away from an idealized,  pre-political  state  of  nature  in  which this  distinctly  human
faculty was latent but undeveloped. Insofar as Rousseau saw its development resulting
from contact among individuals, he tied historical degeneration to the advance of society,
and in particular technology. At the heart of Rousseau’s philosophy of history was thus a
dynamic  tension  between  progress  and  decadence,  driven  by  humanity’s  essential
incompletion.
10 Rousseau’s concept of perfectibility would later be interpreted in a spirit of optimistic
hubris,  however.  In  1793-94,  Condorcet  wrote  in  this  vein  that  ‘no  limit  has  been
determined  for  the  perfecting  of  human  faculties,  that  man’s  perfectibility  is  truly
infinite, that the progress of this perfectibility, freed henceforth from any power who
would stop it, has no limit but the duration of the globe on which we have been cast by
nature’  (cited  in  Brewer,  2008:  50).  This  construal  of  Rousseau is  already present  in
Mercier’s utopia, which combines a linear doctrine of progress with a strong sense of
historical authorship. The protagonist finds himself, he says, on the rung of a progressive
ladder  of  time,  which  will  bring  Paris  to  still  greater  heights  (Koselleck,  2002:  90).
Meanwhile,  unlike in the spatial  utopias that had gone before,  in which the narrator
reported a state of affairs that already existed pre-given somewhere and which he had
happened across, with Mercier the dreaming protagonist becomes the authentic producer
of his own vision. 
11 In  the  interview  with  Adorno,  Bloch  describes  the  significance  of  this  shift  in  the
following terms. In the spatial utopia, he argues, 
‘the wishland was still ready, on a distant island, but I am not there. On the other
hand, when it is transposed into the future, not only am I not there, but utopia
itself is also not with itself. This island does not even exist. But it is not something
like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it is not yet in the sense of a possibility; that
it could be there if only we could do something for it. Not only if we travel there,
but in that we travel there the island utopia arises out of the sea of the possible’
(1988: 3).
12 By claiming this temporal sense of utopia as valid, despite the historical disappointment
hopes placed in it have repeatedly suffered, Bloch identifies his utopianism as a variety of
historical materialism committed to revolutionary progress and a strong sense of human
agency (cf. Bloch, 1998: 339-345). 
13 The materialist conception of a history that can be read from the distance of time is a
question of the fulfilment of a moral demand: as Marx wrote in the 18th Brumaire of Louis
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Bonaparte, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already,
given and transmitted from the past’ (2010c: 103). From a materialist perspective, the task
of history is ‘not a question of drawing a great mental dividing line between past and
future, but of realizing the thoughts of the past’ (Marx, 2010a: 145), in particular those
demands for freedom, equality, solidarity, justice – even, as Adorno affirmed, something
so  seemingly  banal  in  a  consumerist  context  as  happiness –  that  remain  unfulfilled.
Certainly, the possibility of such a practice depends on a philosophy of history in which
the  future  is  at  least  partially  undetermined  and  human  beings  have  a  measure  of
freedom to transform their environment. However, since human beings and their history
are part  of  a larger reality,  the question of  transformative action must also have an
ontological  component.  Bloch’s  utopianism can be seen as  an attempt  to  provide an
ontological foundation for the historical exigencies of a Marxist materialism. 
14 Bloch’s ontology locates the possibility of utopia’s realisation in the constitution of the
material world itself. Just as Kant’s critical turn was an attempt to discover the conditions
of possibility of a thought capable of asserting the categorical imperative of practical
morality, Bloch’s speculative turn considers what would have to be the case for Marx’s
reformulation of the categorical imperative – not only to interpret, but to change the
world – to be capable of being answered. Bloch’s ontology begins from the idea of being as
a ‘Not,’ an absence from which something emerges but which is nonetheless preserved in
the fabric of being as an original absence. In The Principle of Hope, he speaks of this
‘Not with which everything starts up and begins, around which every Something is
still built. […] The Not is lack of Something and also escape from this lack: thus it is
a driving towards what is missing’ (1996: 306).
15 Being  for  Bloch  is  thus  itself  utopian  because  it  is  literally  ‘not  (yet)  there’  in  a
fundamental sense. Miguel Abensour (2008: 408) summarises Bloch’s utopian materialism
succinctly when he says that ‘To the extent that Being is thought at once as process and
as incompletion, utopia and its persistence are inscribed in the very economy of Being’.
16 What Wayne Hudson (1982: 19-20) has called Bloch’s central operator – the category of
the Not-Yet – describes the tendency of the original lack in the material process to push
out of itself towards the unrealised goals latent within it. By positing a deep connection
between the ‘Not-Yet-Become’ content of the material world and a ‘Not-Yet-Conscious’ in
the human being, Bloch makes the human into the author of a utopian history inscribed
into  the  fabric  of  reality  itself.  The  ‘Not-Yet-Conscious  in  man,’  he  writes,  ‘belongs
completely to the Not-Yet-Become, Not-Yet-Brought-Out, Manifested in the world. The
Not-Yet-Conscious  interacts  and  reciprocates  with  Not-Yet-Become,  more  specifically
with what is approaching in history and in the world’ (1996: 13). According to Bloch, by
examining the unfulfilled demands of the past, human beings can analyse what Marx
called the ‘mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself’ (Marx, 2010a: 145); by
activating those demands in the pursuit of a just and peaceful future, we can come to
possess in reality a thing of which the world itself has long dreamed, to which Bloch gives
the name Heimat. 
17 Adorno described as the ‘innermost antinomy’  of  Bloch’s  thought,  which he believed
could not be resolved, that it ‘conceives the end of the world as its ground, that which
moves what exists, which, as its telos, it already inhabits’ (1991: 213). Admittedly, Bloch
concedes that ‘both: Nothing and All – are still in no way decided as utopian characters, as
threatening or fulfilling result-definitions in the world’ (1996: 12). Nevertheless, Adorno’s
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criticism is pertinent: it highlights what is at stake in the politics of the form, namely
questions of teleology and totalization, which have been the subject of vigorous debate in
the aftermath of the Soviet project.  Matthew Charles (2010:  38) has put the criticism
pointedly by arguing, via an interpretation of ‘anticipatory illumination’ [Vorschein] as
the  central  utopian  figure  in  Bloch’s  work,  that  ‘the  true  historical  meaning  and
implication of Bloch’s utopianism’ is ‘Soviet socialism itself’.
18 Yet if, as Adorno claimed, the meaning of Bloch’s utopianism resides in the fact that it
‘makes the last first,’ then it is not Vorschein but, as The Principle of Hope’s literal last word,
Heimat, which ought to be the key figure here. If we understand Heimat as the critical
image of Bloch’s utopia, however, a very different picture of its ‘true historical meaning
and  implication’  emerges.  In  particular,  Heimat significantly  complicates  the  idea  of
Bloch’s utopianism as a linear, purely future-oriented temporal scheme. 
 
II. Heimat
19 Something  strange  happened  to  the  meaning  of  Heimat  in  the  second  half  of  the
eighteenth century.  In  the  German-speaking  lands,  the  word traditionally  denoted  a
birthplace or place of residence, particularly where matters of patrilineal inheritance and
the right to social welfare were concerned. Until well into the nineteenth century the
word was still used as a legal concept to define a person’s domicile under what was known
as Heimatrecht. The 1852 Brockhaus dictionary explained under Heimat the different laws
of domicile in the German states, Austria, England and France. In this early sense, then,
Heimat defined concrete spatial  and temporal  conditions,  as well  as precise legal  and
social relations.3
20 Around the  turn  of  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  the  word’s  meaning  began  to
change.  As  the  traditional,  agrarian  society  in  the  German  territories  gave  way  to
industrial  class  relations,  labour  became  more  mobile,  and  the  rights  previously
associated with a Heimat acquired by birth were now afforded automatically after two
years of residence in a place. The sense of dislocation that these social transformations
engendered is registered in the semantic shift that Heimat underwent. Increasingly, it
denoted not a geographical space, but an imaginary one, located in a romanticised past of
childlike innocence and lost unity with nature. 
21 For Friedrich Hölderlin, ancient Greece became the historical Heimat to which the modern
present must look for inspiration in its time of crisis.4 In his novel Hyperion, Hölderlin
speaks of a ‘spiritual unity’ with nature in the classical world, which is ‘lost for us.’ ‘We
are fallen with nature,’  he says,  ‘and what was once one,  as we may believe,  is  now
resisting’ (Hölderlin, 1946-1977: 236).5 Meanwhile, medieval Catholic Europe was Novalis’
model of a past Heimat. In his 1799 fragment ‘Christianity or Europe,’ Hardenberg evokes
a lost past of peace and innocence, when Europe was a culturally and spiritually unified
entity bound by ‘childlike faith’ (Novalis, 1999: 60).
22 Early  romantic  philosophy  of  history  thus  stood  in  stark  contrast  to  that  of  the
enlightenment, but not only in the sense that the past, not the future, was the site of its
historical  sublime.  Against  a  view of  history  as  a  linear  continuum of  progress,  the
romantics saw it as a cyclical or epochal process. In ‘Christianity or Europe’, Novalis asks
whether ‘oscillation, an opposition of opposed tendencies’ is not proper to a thinking of
history,  explicitly  rejecting  ‘progressive,  constantly  expanding  evolution’  (1999:  64).
Casting a Picture
Anthropology & Materialism, 3 | 2016
6
Meanwhile,  Hölderlin  speaks  of  humanity’s  ‘eccentric  path,’  without  the  prospect  of
resolution  (1946-1977:  558).  Elizabeth  Millán  (2007:  168)  confirms  that  the  romantic
philosophy of  history was part  of  a  broader worldview in which reality  was seen as
‘essentially  incomplete’.6 Since  human  language  is  part  of  this  incomplete  reality,
however, it cannot profess to its complete articulation. Friedrich Schlegel argued in this
spirit  that,  ‘[p]ure  thinking  and  cognition  [Erkennen]  of  the  highest  can  never  be
represented  [dargestellt]  adequately  –  this  is  the  principle  of  the  relative
unrepresentability [Undarstellbarkeit] of the highest’ (cited in Millán, 2007: 168). However,
for  Schlegel,  this  difficulty of  representing the highest  or  infinite  is  overcome when
philosophy embraces the techniques of poetic language, in particular irony, which signals
insight into the impossible necessity of the task of representation. Philosophy, Schlegel
claimed, ‘is the real homeland [Heimat] of irony, which one would like to define as logical
beauty: for wherever philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues – and is not simply
confined into rigid systems – there irony should be asked for and provided’ (ibid.).  In
other words, only through a fusion of poetry and philosophy can we sketch the contours
of the ultimate.
23 It  is  clear,  as  Ivan Boldyrev (2014:  35)  has  argued elsewhere,  that  Bloch’s  writing is
motivated by Schlegel’s ‘philosophical esprit.’ However, while Boldyrev describes Bloch’s
stance as hovering ‘between denying the system altogether and realizing that the system
is indispensable, between the necessity and the impossibility of the absolute utterance’ (
ibid.), I propose a rather less ambivalent reading. Bloch’s literary style in no sense denies
the need for systematic thought; rather, it acknowledges that the questions it addresses
imply a totalizing perspective of which conventional philosophical language is incapable.
Such a perspective can only be approximated by composing multiple fragments in a
language that speaks not only to the mind, but also to the body. In Spirit of Utopia (2000:
193), Bloch writes of the ambivalence of a philosophical language that will do justice to
speculative questions that ‘[t]he simplest word is already much too much for it, the most
sublime word much too little again.’ As such, Bloch’s language can be seen to embody
Heimat in the Schlegelian sense that its literary form implies insight into the speculative
nature of its pronouncements. 
24 The final passage of Bloch’s Principle of Hope,  in particular, is saturated with romantic
irony. The crucial sentence, on which everything hangs, stands out because it is italicised.
If there were any doubt that the meaning of Bloch’s utopianism resides in its last word,
the text itself confirms it: ‘True genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end.’ And at the end
we find the concept whose genesis is achieved, in Hegelian fashion, only through the
process it embodies: Heimat. Yet the tension between the content of the assertion here
and the form it  takes performs a contradiction between the temporal  coordinates of
beginning and ending. The sentence literally ‘makes the last first’ by emphasising the end
as  the  site  of  genesis;  yet  the  imperfect  figura  etymologica  in  which  cognate  words
signifying beginning – ‘genesis,’ ‘beginning,’ ‘starts’, but also the metaphor of rootedness
– are successively repeated, over-determines Heimat as a search for origins.
25 Bloch understood such origins to be pure illusion just as well as the romantics did. As in
Hölderlin’s poem Homecoming (Hölderlin, 1998: 160), where ‘Everything seems familiar; /
Even people passing by greet each other as if they were / Friends, and every face appears
like kin’ the first thing that one notices about Bloch’s Heimat is that it scheint. In other
words, it offers the appearance of innocence and joy rather than providing them in reality.
It is this symbolic sense of appearance as misleading (‘all that glitters is not gold’) that we
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find in Bloch’s own vision of Heimat, which ‘shines into the childhood of all’. Here, the
double meaning of the word scheinen reiterates Bloch’s insight into the nostalgic vision of
the past as a false vision. Against Adorno’s claim that Bloch’s utopian traces are merely
‘survivals of the ineffable experience of childhood which once upon a time communicated
everything,’ (Adorno, 1980: 49), Bloch explicitly acknowledges that ‘no one has yet been’
in such a childhood (1996: 1376).
26 Just as in Home (1998: 55), Hölderlin speaks to ‘Kind river-banks that tended and brought
me up,’  and ‘forests  of  my childhood,’  Bloch’s  metaphor  of  roots  at  first  appears  to
connect Heimat with the idea of a lost natural unity. Insofar as the romantic image of
Heimat is ‘always pastoral,  in that its ideal resides in a state of nature’,  the figure of
Rousseau once again haunts this picture (de Man, 2012: 110). Contra Marx, for whom
Rousseau was the author of a survivalist Robinsonade (Marx, 2010d: 17), Bloch claims that
‘[e]ven  wilderness,  the  apparently  most  extreme anti-pole  to  the  world  of  men and
plants,’ was incorporated into Rousseau’s image of nature as ‘an Arcadia that had become
sentimental’  (Bloch,  1996:  389).  Meanwhile,  for  Hölderlin (in whose mythic  pantheon
Rousseau’s is the only historical name), Rousseau is neither the optimistic herald of linear
progress evinced by Mercier, nor Bloch’s nostalgic naturalist. ‘[S]eparation, pantheism
and a temporal structure that moves from a remembered past to an ideal future’ (de Man,
2012:  110)  are  the  hallmarks  of  Hölderlin’s  Rousseau,  whose  concept  of  human
perfectibility he interprets as an essentially endless process, the ‘infinite approximation’ [
unendliche Annäherung] of perfection (Hölderlin, 1946-1977: 558). 
27 The  relevance  of  Hölderlin’s  reading  of  Rousseau  for  Bloch’s  Heimat  figure  becomes
clearer when we examine how the infinite approximation of perfection is expressed by
Novalis. Heinrich von Ofterdingen is a fragmentary novel telling of a medieval Minnesänger
in search of a mystical union with divine nature. In the second part of Novalis’ novel, the
pilgrim meets a mysterious girl who responds to his questions with cryptic answers, and
leads him away from his path. When he asks ‘Where are we going?’ she simply replies
‘Always  homeward  [Immer  nach  Hause],’  the  word  ‘always’  expressing  the  ultimate
impossibility of reaching the intended destination (Novalis, 2008: 345). There is a clear
parallel here with the structure of The Principle of Hope. The text opens with a series of
questions: ‘Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? [Italics mine] What
are we waiting for? What awaits us?’ (Bloch, 1996: 3) and ends with the word ‘Heimat’
which – if read as a linear narrative – seems to stand as a definitive answer. However,
given that the concept of Heimat is associated with the search for origins, our arrival at
the end seems to return us to the same questions with which we began. The text can thus
be seen simultaneously to perform linear and cyclical motions, oscillating between past
and future in a way that calls attention to the present as a not-entirely-absent referent.
For indeed, though Bloch refers to both past and future dimensions here, he invariably
uses  present-tense  forms.  Instead  of  being  told  that  true  genesis  ‘will  come’  at  the
beginning, we find that it ‘comes’. Similarly, instead of saying that no one ‘was’ ever in a
place like an imagined Heimat, Bloch opts for the present perfect ‘has yet been.’ Heimat
‘will’ not ‘arise’ in a world beyond expropriation and alienation: it ‘arises.’7
28 Adorno (1992: 142) emphasizes a similar presencing technique in Hölderlin’s poetry with
reference  to  a  particular  line  in  Mnemosyne (‘perhaps  the  most important  text  for
deciphering Hölderlin philosophically’). It reads: ‘But forward and backward we will / Not
look,’ and Adorno interprets this as expressing Hölderlin’s observance of the Bilderverbot.
He says: 
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‘Not forward: under the law of the present, which in Hölderlin is the law of poetry,
with a taboo against abstract utopia, a taboo in which the theological ban on graven
images,  which  Hölderlin  shares  with  Hegel  and  Marx,  lives  on.  Not  backwards:
because of the irretrievability of something once overthrown, the point at which
poetry, history and ideal intersect’ (ibid.). 
29 Just as de Man argues that the romantic image of Heimat must remain ‘always image,’
because it can only conceive of that which ‘is not in its present possession’ (de Man, 2012:
110), so Adorno recognizes that Hölderlin’s ‘maxim of not looking backwards is directed
against the chimera of origin’ [Italics mine] (Adorno, 1992: 142).  Bloch’s philosophy of
history shares with Hölderlin’s an explicit orientation on Heimat as a human existence
disalienated in every respect (cf. Mieth, 2007: 214).8 Yet in both cases, insofar as Heimat is
about a search for origins, these must remain a goal, since what we seek in nostalgic
visions of the past was never really there.9 According to Bloch, a nostalgic ‘melancholy of
fulfillment […] accompanies anything invested with too much image’ (Bloch, 1996: 234).
Michael Löwy connects such naïve nostalgia with a ‘reactionary romanticism’, which he
opposes with a  ‘revolutionary’  variety such as  we find in Benjamin and Bloch.  Löwy
argues that the aim of revolutionary romanticism is ‘not a return to the past, but a detour
through the past on the way to a utopian future’ (Löwy, 2005: 5). Insight into the chimeric
nature of the image thus calls attention to the insufficiency of a present that requires
illusions about its own history. Yet for Bloch these illusions are not simply mythic: he
rather interprets them as an index of the future as we might wish it to be. Since historical
materialism is for Bloch the ‘[p]hilosophy…of the future’ (1996: 9), it is therefore also that
of the ‘future in the past’.
 
III. History
30 Something  strange  happened  to  the  concept  of  history  in  the  second  half  of  the
eighteenth century. The German word for a narrative account of the past, Historie, was
gradually swallowed up by the word for the events of the past, Geschichte (cf. Koselleck,
2004: 12). The one word now designated the past and the story we tell of it; reality and
representation became inseparable. To understand why this happened, it is helpful to
revisit Marx’s understanding of the late eighteenth century as the moment when the
industrial  revolution  produced  the  ‘specifically  capitalist  mode  of  production’  (cf.
McNally,  1988:  14).  The  demands  of  mechanization  and  global  distribution  required
homogeneity of time across large spatial distances. Jonathan Martineau stresses that the
measure of  clock-time is  ‘not a creation of  [industrial]  capitalism’ per se,  but spread
throughout  the  transitional  period  of  agrarian  capitalism  to  form  an  increasingly
standardized  ‘temporal  infrastructure’  (2015:  94).  It  was  nevertheless  capitalism,
Martineau concedes, that would ‘universalize this clock-time infrastructure and make it
into the hegemonic form of time in capitalist societies’ (2015: 95). In this context, the
demands  of  capitalist  time  began  to  exert  a  homogenizing  pressure  on  historical
consciousness, and the distinction between narrative and chronological time was eroded.
31 Not  incidentally,  it  was  at  just  this  moment  that  the  academic  discipline  of  history
emerged in Germany, dominated by a historicist tradition whose aim was, in the words of
its most famous representative Leopold von Ranke, to tell history ‘as it actually was’ [wie
es eigentlich gewesen] (cf. von Ranke, 1885: VII).10 Of course, to tell history ‘as it actually
was’  in  fact  meant  to  collapse  the  plurality  of  experience  into  a  single,  official
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representation.11 It  is  against  precisely  this  historicist  view  that  the  materialist
conception of history is articulated: not in the sense that materialist historiography is
unconcerned with factual accuracy or methodological rigor (indeed, in this respect, as
well as in its understanding of the radically historical character of human existence it
shares much with other varieties of historicist thought that emerged in the same period).
Rather, contrary to that form of historicism which, as Benjamin argues, ‘musters a mass
of data to fill…homogeneous, empty time’, depoliticizing history by collapsing reality and
representation,  materialist  historiography  approaches  its  object  as  a  ‘revolutionary
chance  in  the  fight  for  the  oppressed  past’  that  escapes  ‘official’  narratives  (1968:
262-263).
32 Benjamin fleshes out this position in his XIV thesis on the philosophy of history, which
proposes  that  ‘History  is  the  object  of  a  construction  whose  place  is  formed not  in
homogenous and empty time, but in that which is fulfilled by the now [Jetztzeit]’ (1968:
261). For Robespierre, Benjamin claims, referring obliquely to Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire
(cf.  Marx,  2010c:  104),  ‘Roman antiquity was a past  charged with the now,  which he
exploded out of the continuum of history’ (ibid.). This vision of history, in which the
‘tradition of dead generations’ becomes in the present the political demand for future
redemption,  is  a historical  materialism infused with the twin spirits  of  revolutionary
romanticism and Jewish  messianism.  According  to  Löwy (2007:  7),  messianism is  for
Benjamin ‘at  the heart  of  the Romantic  conception of  time and history’.  Just  as  the
romantics saw the past as a detour on the way to a utopian future, so too for Jewish
messianism the ‘utopian content of the past becomes the material basis for a vision of the
future’ (Rabinbach, 1985: 84). Bloch cites in this context the ‘myth of the Golden Age and
its transposition into the future in the messianic consciousness of so many oppressed
classes  and peoples’  as  evidence that  ‘[t]he good New is  never  that  completely  new’
(Bloch, 1996: 60); the measure of historical novelty thus becomes the extent to which it
answers the previously unfulfilled demands of the revolutionary tradition.
33 If  in  his  ‘Theological-Political  Fragment’,  Benjamin  declared  that  ‘nothing  that  is
historical can relate itself on its own account to anything messianic’ (1968: 312), after
1924 he saw the dynamics of the sacred and profane orders as dialectically connected. In
particular, the messianic present, as the moment of a demand for redemption, becomes
Benjamin’s key to interpreting the historical legacy of class struggle. It is on this basis
that  Benjamin  develops  the  concept  of  the  dialectical  image  as  an  instrument  of  a
specifically materialist historiography. Benjamin provides his most complete articulation
of the dialectical image in convolute N of the Arcades project, where he writes that
‘It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its
light on the past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a
flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a
standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal,
continuous  one,  the  relation  of  what-has-been  to  the  now  is  dialectical:  is  not
progression but image, suddenly emergent. – Only dialectical images are genuine
images (that is, not archaic); and the place where one encounters them is language’
(1999: 462). 
34 The difficulties of interpretation of this passage are well known, and it is not possible
here to do justice to the full scope of that debate.12 However, I disagree with Susan Buck-
Morss, both in her assertion that Benjamin’s concept is excessively opaque, and in her
argument that it marks a sharp distinction between his thought and Bloch’s (cf. Buck-
Morss, 1991, p. 67; p. 114). In an effort to decipher Benjamin’s concept, we might recall
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here de Man’s proposition that an image is only ‘image’ insofar as it depicts what is not in
our  present  possession  (2012:  112).  In  this  spirit,  Benjamin  insists  on  a  moment  of
dialectical synthesis in the image between ‘what has been’ – history as catastrophe, a
Hegelian  slaughter-bench  at  which  the  happiness  of  the  great  majority  has  been
repeatedly sacrificed – and the ‘now’ as a demand for that continuum to be broken. It is in
this sense, I argue, that Bloch’s utopian Heimat must be recognized as a dialectical image
after Benjamin.
35 Buck-Morss  (1991:  114)  argues  that  Benjamin,  unlike  Bloch,  was  ‘reluctant  to  rest
revolutionary hope directly on imagination’s capacity to anticipate the not-yet existing’.
Accordingly,  Benjamin  is  said  to  have  realised  that  even  as  wish  image,  ‘utopian
imagination needed to be interpreted through the material  objects in which it  found
expression, for (as Bloch knew) it was upon the transforming mediation of matter that
the  hope  of  utopia  ultimately  depended:  technology’s  capacity  to  create  the  not-yet
known’ (ibid.). Yet Bloch’s and Benjamin’s positions on these questions are a lot closer and
a lot subtler than Buck-Morss allows. Bloch rested revolutionary hope simply on dreams
no more than either he or Benjamin rested it simply on technology. In volume two of The
Principle  of  Hope,  Bloch  explicitly  examines  various  forms  of  technology  as  potential
bearers of the desire for emancipatory transformation. Simultaneously, as we have seen,
he  invokes  the  concept  of  Heimat  partly  as  a  critique  of  technological  ‘progress’.
Ultimately, though, for both Bloch and Benjamin, neither wishful images nor technology
are sufficient without political action. Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image, and
Bloch’s articulation of it in the Heimat figure, make history as a call to action visible.
36 Here  we  find  a  stark  contrast  between  Benjamin’s  and  Bloch’s  fidelity  to  a  certain
conception  of  the  image  on  the  one  hand,  and  Adorno’s  Bilderverbot on  the  other.
Adorno’s concept of the Bilderverbot arises from his continued commitment to that radical
disconnection between the messianic and historical  temporal  orders,  which Benjamin
formerly espoused. For Adorno, the completely new represented by the messianic – the
‘transformation of the totality’, up to and including the transcendence of death – is so
utterly unimaginable from the perspective of history that to make an image of it is not
only  strictly  speaking  impossible,  but  leads  to  the  most  aberrant  politics.  Adorno
interprets Bloch’s understanding of utopia as already partially achieved in the various images
of it as indicative of a dangerous and complacent optimism in this regard: why act, if
utopia is already achieved in images that guarantee the ultimate certainty of its advent? 
37 But  to  read  Bloch’s  concept  of  the  utopian  image  as  the  mere  projection  of  a  goal
immanently  given as  achieved is  too  simplistic:  Bloch (1996:  47)  readily  admits  that
wishful images ‘do nothing,’ but rather insists that ‘they depict and retain with particular
fidelity  what  must  be  done’.  Moreover,  Adorno’s  stark  opposition  also  results  in
ambiguity. Consider again his reading of the line from Hölderlin’s Mnemosyne (‘perhaps
the most important text for deciphering Hölderlin philosophically’):  ‘But forward and
back we will / Not look. Be rocked as / On swaying skiff of the sea.’ Here Adorno claims
the anacolutha in the second part of the verse reveals Hölderlin’s ‘intention to cast aside
the synthesis of the image,’ and ‘trust to pure passivity in order to completely fulfill the
present’ (Adorno, 1992: 142). On the one hand, the charge of complacency is implicit in
Adorno’s  critique  of  any  fidelity  to  images  of  historical  redemption.  Yet  Hölderlin’s
refusal to envision either the past or the future, which Adorno holds up as exemplary, can
equally be seen to conjure the present as the site of a call, not for action, but for passive
acceptance. 
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38 This ambivalence is further illustrated in the interview with Bloch, when Adorno assumes
‘the unexpected role of attorney for the positive’ at a point in the discussion dealing with
the possibility of class revolution (Bloch, 1988: 13). If the picture of this prospect, Adorno
concedes, cannot ‘appear within one’s grasp’, then ‘one basically does not know at all
what  the actual  reason for  the totality  is,  why the entire  apparatus  has  been set  in
motion’ (ibid.). In other words, the one moment in which it becomes possible, perhaps
even necessary, for Adorno to cast a picture of utopia is in the context of class struggle. 
39 In his aphorism ‘Refuge for the homeless’ from Minima Moralia, Adorno, like Bloch, poses
the problem of proletarian revolution in terms of humanity’s historical homelessness.
Contrasting the bourgeois concept of home with both the fascist fetish for living close to
the land, and modernist attempts to create an entirely new kind of space, Adorno finds all
three visions wanting. Hence it is ‘part of morality [today],’ he writes, ‘not to be at home
in one’s house’ (Adorno, 2005: 39). Although Adorno does not cast a positive picture of
what a situation beyond this alienated present might look like, he does paint quite a clear
negative image of it. The point turns on the ‘difficult relationship’ he observes between
people vis-à-vis their property, which consists, he claims, in cleaving simultaneously to
two opposing ideas: first, that private property no longer belongs to one person, because
the abundance of consumer goods has become so great that no individual can claim to
restrict it; and second, that nevertheless one must have property in order not to find
oneself in a situation of privation, which simply perpetuates the blind continuation of the
relations of ownership. ‘But,’ Adorno counters to his own straw man, 
‘the  thesis  of  this  paradox leads  to  destruction,  a  loveless  lack  of  attention for
things,  which necessarily  turns  against  human beings  too;  and the antithesis  is
already, the moment one expresses it, an ideology for those who want to keep what
is theirs with a bad conscience’ (ibid.). 
40 As the final line of the aphorism – ‘a wrong life cannot be lived rightly’ – makes clear, for
Adorno, the only solution to the paradox of private property is a utopian ‘transformation
of the totality’, the abolition of private property, which would establish a true Heimat
beyond the merely abstract projections of Bauhaus and Bodenständigkeit (ibid.).13 Bloch’s
Heimat is  an attempt,  not  to depict  such a  situation positively,  but  to adumbrate its
contours by emphasizing what all those previous attempts to picture it have in common. 
41 As the claim that ‘all and everything stands before creation of the world as a right one’
makes clear, Bloch recognizes that the contents of the utopian Heimat image (harmony
with nature, the ‘real democracy’ of Hölderlin’s polis, and a society ‘without expropriation
and alienation’) have never been achieved.14 Yet this is precisely the reason why images
of utopia and of Heimat still have a historical purchase, above all as the products and
inspiration of the historical agents of the required transformation. For Bloch, that agent
is none other than ‘the working, creating human being who reshapes and overhauls the
given facts’. But what if history is, as Althusser (2001: 94) claimed, ‘a process without a
subject’  capable of  redeeming the political  debts  of  the past? If  all  forms of  Marxist
humanism really are ‘no more than ashes’ (Althusser, 1969: 230), what hope is there ‘to
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable being’?
(Marx, 2010b: 182). 
42 An answer is perhaps to be found in Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,
written in 1859, after what Althusser considers his decisive anti-humanist turn. There,
Marx claims that the ‘bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the
social process of production’ and that the ‘prehistory of human society accordingly closes
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with  this  social  formation’  (Marx:  2010e:  263-4).  However,  the  failure  of  the  French
Revolution  to  establish  the  freedom  of  the  masses, not  to  mention  the  failure  of
successive attempts at proletarian revolution, mean that human beings everywhere ‘still
live in prehistory’ according to Bloch: what Benjamin (1968: 263) calls the ‘leap into the
open sky of history’ is yet to be achieved. 
43 Bloch’s  emancipatory  philosophy  of  history  is  thus  not  merely  the  Heimat of  irony,
cynically acknowledging itself as limited by its participation in the totalizing perspective
it avows; it is also a variety of that materialist philosophy which, as Adorno (2004: 3) said
of his own negative dialectics, ‘lives on because the moment to realize it was missed’.
Bloch’s anticipatory response to Adorno was that the ‘basic theme of philosophy which
remains […] is  the still  unbecome,  still  unachieved homeland [Heimat],  as  it  develops
outwards and upwards in the dialectical-materialistic struggle of the New with the old’
(1996:  9).  His  dialectical  image  of  Heimat asserts  that  a  materialist  interpretation  of
history will always be necessary, until the world is truly changed.
 
Conclusion
44 The eighteenth century was  a  moment  in  which,  at  the  birth of  modern capitalism,
European conceptions of history (which, through the spread of capitalism itself, would
exert themselves more or less forcefully around the world) were profoundly altered. The
continued  oppression,  exploitation  and  alienation  of  human  beings  under  capitalist
conditions testify to the fact that we are still contemporaries of that historical moment.
The ideology of progress, according to which what is currently the case is qualitatively
superior to what has gone before simply by virtue of succeeding it chronologically, has
failed. Meanwhile, contemporary consumerist nostalgia – the archaic vision of history –
so commonplace today, mistakes in its image of the past as a real historical sublime in
which the deficiencies of the now never existed. Fred Jameson (2005: xi-xii) has argued
that the ‘relationship between utopia and the political, as well as questions about the
practical-political  value of  utopian thinking and identification between socialism and
utopia, very much continue to be unresolved topics today’. I hope this exegesis of Bloch’s
concept of a utopian Heimat has shown two things: first, that historical materialism needs
images, albeit ones which it recognizes as not the thing itself. While Bloch and Benjamin
understand this, Adorno equivocates. Second is that the value of Bloch’s utopianism lies
in its ability to highlight the historical debt the present owes to the catastrophic failures
of past attempts at social liberation. Perhaps in this sense, utopia can recover its vitality
as both a serious category of  materialist  historiography,  and a ‘politically energizing
perspective’ for the future (Jameson, 2005: xii).
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NOTES
1. I have slightly adapted the translation by Plaice, Plaice and Knight here.
2. For a detailed account of Adorno’s concept of the Bilderverbot, see Alexander Garcia Düttmann,
“Dialectics and the Ban on Images” in The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno
(New York: London: Continuum Press, 2002), pp. 70-87.
3. I am indebted to Andrea Bastian’s (1995) conceptual history of Heimat here.
4. Admittedly Hölderlin’s position in relation to romanticism is ambivalent. Paul de Man (2012:
119) sees Hölderlin as ‘Standing at the beginning of the romantic tradition,’ but he also ‘points
beyond it,  away from it.’  However, others clearly recognize Hölderlin’s work as exemplary of
early German romanticism: cf. Manfred Frank (2012).
5. The original sentence reads: ‘Wir sind zerfallen mit der Natur, und was einst, als man glauben
kann, Eins war, widerstreitet sich jetzt.’
6. Cf. also Christiane Rühling (2015: 2).
7. It  is  important  to  note  that  this  is  also  the  case  in  the  original  German,  which  also
distinguishes between simple and compound (present) perfect and future tenses.
8. Original:  ‘Ihr  geschichtsphilosophisches  Denken  und  Sinnen  ist  auf  in  jedweder  Hinsicht
unentfremdetes menschliches Dasein gerichtet, auf “Heimat.”’
9. ‘Origin is the goal,’ first the motto of Austrian satirist Karl Kraus, is well known as the preface
to Benjamin’s XIV thesis on the philosophy of history, to which I turn in more detail below.
10. NB: the original essay was written in 1824.
11. For  a  detailed  account  of  the  political  implications  of  the  German historicist  tradition  (
Historismus), cf. George G. Iggers (1983), or more recently, Frederick Beiser (2011).
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12. Cf. in particular for useful discussions: Werner Hamacher (2001), Eli Friedlander (2008), and
Max Pensky (2004).
13. Bloch’s words in German – ‘alles und jedes steht noch vor Erschaffung der Welt, als einer
rechten’ – clearly echo those in Adorno’s text – ‘Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen.’ Cf.
Bloch (1977: 1628) and Adorno (1969: 26). 
14. In his essay ‘Hölderlin’s Hyperion,’ Georg Lukács claims that the poet ‘remains faithful to the
old revolutionary ideal of renovating polis democracy and is broken by a reality which had no
place for his ideals, not even on the level of poetry and thought.’ Cf. Lukács, (1969: 148).
ABSTRACTS
Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image, this paper reads Ernst Bloch’s
utopian Heimat figure as poetically staging the temporal dialectics of materialist history. Bloch
combines romantic, messianic and materialist temporalities in a critique of the modern progress
narrative,  which  inscribes  historicity  in  the  mere  next-ness  of  each  now.  The  continued
oppression, exploitation and alienation of human beings under conditions of modern capitalism
stands as testimony to the falseness of this assumption. Far from the simplistic teleology with
which materialist theories of history in general, and Bloch’s in particular, have so often been
identified, utopia as Heimat sets up a complex spatiotemporal matrix which fixes the present as
the locus of possibility of transformative action. Only by activating the unfulfilled claims of the
past in the interest of a more just future can human beings occupy utopia: that is the meaning
which I  argue Bloch’s Heimat image brings to bear on contemporary materialist  thought and
practice. 
À partir du concept benjaminien d'image dialectique, cet article lit la figure utopique du Heimat, 
présente chez Ernst Bloch, comme une mise en scène poétique des temporalités dialectiques de
l'histoire matérialiste. Bloch combine les temporalités romantique, messianique et matérialiste
dans une critique du récit moderne du progrès, qui inscrit l'historicité dans la linéarité d'une
simple  succession  temporelle.  Le caractère  durable  de  l'oppression,  de  l'exploitation  et  de
l'aliénation des êtres humains au sein du capitalisme moderne témoigne de la fausseté de cette
vision des choses. À distance de la téléologie simpliste à laquelle les théories matérialistes de
l'histoire  en  général,  et  celle  de  Bloch en particulier,  ont  si  souvent  été  identifiées,  l'utopie
comme Heimat développe une matrice spatio-temporelle complexe, au sein de laquelle le présent
est  le  lieu  où  une  action  transformative  est  possible.  C'est seulement  en  activant  les
revendications inaccomplies du passé dans l'intérêt d'un futur plus juste que les êtres humains
peuvent  occuper l'espace de l'utopie.  Tel  est,  à  mon sens,  la  signification que prend l'image
blochienne du Heimat pour les réflexions et les pratiques matérialistes contemporaines. 
En el marco del concepto de imagen dialéctica de Walter Benjamin, el presente artículo busca
leer la figura utópica del Heimat en Ernst Bloch, como en emplazamiento poético de las dialécticas
temporales de la historia materialista. Bloch combina la temporalidad romántica, la mesiánica y
la materialista en una crítica al relato moderno del progreso, que inscribe la historicidad en la
mera  prolongación  de  cada  presente.  La  continua  opresión,  explotación  y  alienación  del  ser
humano bajo las condiciones del capitalismo moderno se exponen como testimonio de la falsedad
de esta visión de cosas. Lejos de la teleología simplista con la cual las teorías materialistas de la
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historia han sido a menudo identificadas, tanto de modo general  como también en Bloch,  la
utopía como Heimat plantea una matriz espacio-temporal compleja que fija el presente como un
lugar donde una acción transformativa es posible. Sólo en la activación de las reivindicaciones
incumplidas del pasado en miras a un futuro más justo, los seres humanos pueden ocupar la
utopía: este es el significado que aporta, a mi parecer, la imagen del Heimat vista en Bloch, para
las reflexiones y las prácticas materialistas contemporáneas. 
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